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ABSTRACT 
This is an empirical study analyzing the corporate finance and governance 
structure in Malaysia before and after the financial crisis of 1997, utilizing the agency 
cost approach. The contribution of this paper is to link the corporate governance 
mechanism with the role of banks and corporate ownership structure taking into 
account the institutional framework and historical background of the Malaysian 
financial system. 
Based on data for 375 non-financial KLSE (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) 
listed companies during fiscal years 1995-99, our analysis is organized into three parts.   
Section 2 outlines characteristics of corporate finance in Malaysia in the 1990s using 
aggregated time-series data.    Section 3 examines determinants of capital structure via 
cross-sectional regressions in terms of dependency on banks, availability of internal 
funds, ownership concentration, ethnic ownership structure, industry effects, etc.    And 
in section 4, we estimate simple investment functions with panel data in order to 
examine the effects of debt financing on corporate investments before the crisis.     
Empirical results show that the commitment of banks to finance corporate debt 
as well as lending obviously increased debt ratios. Ownership concentration mitigates 
conflict between managers and owners. Foreign ownership also contributed to a 
reduction in the agency costs of equity financing. However, increasing ownership by 
native Malays (Bumiputera), both the direct and indirect holding of corporate shares, 
played no significant role in disciplining corporate management. Finally, high 
dependency on debt led to excessive corporate investment before the crisis.  These 
results imply that the concentration of risks on the banking sector and social policy 
advocating the dispersion of corporate ownership weakened the corporate governance 
mechanism, thereby exacerbating the distress of Malaysia’s corporate sector during the 
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Southeast Asian countries experienced an unprecedented economic upsurge and 
downfall in the 1990s.  Since the financial crisis of 1997, many economists have 
pointed to the insufficiency or malfunctioning of the corporate governance mechanism 
as one of the major factors responsible for causing the situation or at least accelerating 
the deterioration, which reflects the high degree of dependence of firms on banking 
institutions for financing in the region as well as concentration of corporate ownership 
on  families.   
Because of this incomplete separation of ownership from company groups or 
owner families, the monitoring ability of banking institutions as outside fund suppliers 
is thus brought into question. Although the capital markets expanded dramatically in 
the early 1990s, arbitrary control by insiders seemed to continue as before because of 
inadequate corporate disclosure, absence of an independent external auditing system, 
the weak legal protection afforded small shareholders, underdeveloped institutional 
investments, etc. As a consequence, agency conflict between corporate insiders and 
outsiders is seemingly more serious than in the US or the UK, where ownership is 
more diffused and information asymmetry less marked.     
      The above is a harsh caricature of Asian corporate governance structure before 
the crisis.  Obviously, improved corporate governance is essential for Asian countries 
to enable them to restructure not only their financial systems but also economic 
systems.  However, in fact, the situation differs significantly from country to country 
and it is over simplistic to think that a prescription for restructuring corporate 
governance could be applied from a Western viewpoint. 
To discuss corporate governance in Asia, it is necessary to accumulate 
empirical analyses with respect to individual countries. Agency problems should be 
discussed, but in the context of the historical and political background to the corporate 
system as well as financial system.    La Porta, Lopez-de Siliances, Schleifer and Vishny 
(1997), and Schleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasize the institutional constraints on 
external finance, for example, legal protection for lenders and individual investors with 
different historical backgrounds.  And Roe (1994) emphasizes political aspects of 
ownership structure in the US.    However, because of different institutional framework 
and historical background we should be cautious in analyzing the corporate governance 
mechanism in Asian firms.   
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the financing behavior and 
governance structure of Malaysian firms before and after the financial crisis in 1997 
utilizing the agency cost approach.    Our analysis is organized as follows.   
In section 2, we explain some aspects of Malaysian corporate finance in the 
1990s and the historical background from the viewpoint of agency theory.  The key 
role of banks in the financial system and also social policy in terms of the dispersion of  4
corporate ownership are especially important in Malaysia when considering the agency 
costs of corporate finance.  Section 3 examines the determinants of capital structure 
through cross-sectional regressions during fiscal years 1995-99 in terms of dependency 
on banks, the availability of internal funds, ownership structure, ownership 
concentration, and industry effects. 
  Section 4 focuses on the relation between investment behavior and the corporate 
governance structure before and after the crisis.    Firstly, by decomposing the data into 
two panel data sets (1995-96 and 1998-99), we illustrate the differences in capital 
structure determinants during the two periods through panel regression.  Secondly, 
we estimate simple investment functions for the period before the crisis in order to 
examine the effects of debt financing on corporate investments.  Section 5 makes 
concluding remarks and presents some policy implications for the future development 
of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
  
Some remarkable findings were obtained from the empirical results.  The high 
debt ratio of listed companies was obviously related to dependency on banking 
institutions, not only in terms of loans but also commitment to other debt financing.  
As far as ownership structure is concerned, foreign ownership and concentration of 
ownership contributed to reducing the agency costs of equity financing, but ownership 
by ethnic Malays, who hold more than 30% of corporate shares both directly and 
indirectly, played no significant role in disciplining corporate management.  Finally, 
we see high dependency on debt being responsible for excessive corporate investments 
before the crisis.  These results imply that increasing dependency on debt financing 
supported by the banking sector and ownership dispersion because of social policy 
weakened the corporate governance mechanism resulting in internal momentum 
toward economic distress.   
 
 
2. Agency Problems and Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
2.1 Agency Approach to Corporate Governance 
2.1.1 Balancing Approach 
     There are two basic approaches to explain the capital structure of firms in 
incomplete financial markets. One is the so called ‘balancing approach’ to corporate 
finance, which drives firms to search for an optimal capital structure in a trade-off 
between the advantages and costs of different financing measures.  In fact, some legal 
and institutional factors might be critical in the choice, for example, the tax advantage 
of debt related to interest payments and the non-tax advantage related to depreciation, 
and fees and procedures required for the issuance of securities in the markets.  But, 
there might be a limit to debt ratio because it is accepted as a signal of the possibility 
of financial distress.  Also, the legal responsibilities of corporate managers to lenders  5
and shareholders might be different. All of the above are related to the costs of 
different forms of financing. 
    From a static viewpoint, empirical analyses based on this approach have been 
dominated by studies seeking an optimal capital structure or optimal mix of financing 
vehicles.  However, an optimal capital structure will change in adjusting to the 
imbalance between real investment opportunities and availability of funds.  From a 
dynamic viewpoint, managers have to choose financing vehicles ranging from lower to 
higher cost in order.  This sort of financing behavior is termed the ‘pecking-order 
hypothesis’, and Shyam-Sunder and Myer (1999) insist it is more applicable for the 
balancing approach.   
 
2.1.2 Agency Cost Approach to External Financing 
     The other basic approach to capital structure focuses on the conflict of interest in 
information asymmetry among different types of stakeholders of the firm, which 
Jensen and Mechling (1976) examined.  If there is information asymmetry between 
major stakeholders, corporate managers (and/or owner managers) and external fund 
suppliers such as lenders and investors, outsiders tend to underestimate the value of 
the firm because of possible losses caused by moral hazard attaching to corporate 
managers.  Thus, this sort of conflict of interest increases the financing cost of 
external funds for managers, which is termed the ‘agency cost approach’ to corporate 
finance. 
     According to the agency cost approach, managers tend to prefer internal funds to 
external funds in order to avoid agency conflict.  However, as the availability of 
internal funds is limited, they have to choose external funds paying agency costs.  
Sometimes they make efforts to reduce agency costs by mitigating conflict with fund 
suppliers by providing information, enhancing communication, agreeing to monitoring 
by large lenders, etc. 
  In general, managers prefer to raise internal funds to the extent possible 
permitted by liquidity constraints.  Then they look to raise external funds where the 
involvement of outsiders is the minimum.  Among external fund options, they 
generally tend to prefer debt financing to equity capital issuance, and then borrowings 
to debt securities.  This is the ‘pecking order hypothesis’ based on the agency cost 
approach. 
 
2.1.3 Monitoring by Banks     
Regarding debt instruments, managers have different preferences.  Leland and 
Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984) focus on the role of banks as information suppliers, 
which work to mitigate agency conflict between lenders and corporate managers due to 
information asymmetry.  Examining the Japanese case, Hoshi et al. (1990) insist that 
firms are given incentives to maintain relationships with banks and to submit to  6
monitoring in order to reduce the agency cost of borrowings.  Ikeo and Hirota (1992) 
also present evidence to show that Japan’s main bank system has worked to reduce the 
agency costs of debt in general.   
 
2.1.4 Ownership Structure and Agency Costs of Equity Capital 
     Agency problems relating to equity capital have three aspects, the conflict of 
interest between managers and owners, between owners and lenders, and between 
inside owners and outside owners or investors.  Theoretically, ownership by managers 
is the best solution to solve the first agency problem. It is a typical incentive compatible 
solution.  Lenders having shareholdings in the firm is one possible solution to the 
second problem.  The third problem, conflict between inside owners and outside 
owners, can be solved by increasing institutional ownership.  Let us consider 
institutional investment.   
 The concentration of ownership on large outside shareholders might contribute to 
solving the free-rider problem attaching to small shareholders who do not actively 
commit to corporate management.  The dispersion of ownership possibly depresses 
corporate governance in the equity market, increasing information asymmetry 
problems between insiders and outsiders.   
    Long-term institutional investors, especially pension funds and their trustee 
bodies, have been increasingly required to fulfil fiduciary responsibility and behave as 
agents of their customers.  Thus, they are expected to contribute to the benefits of 
their customers or beneficiaries via a direct commitment to the management of 
companies they invest in, as well as through trading activities in the markets, both of 
which discipline corporate management and increase corporate value if properly 
effected.   
        
2.2 Historical Background to Corporate Finance in Malaysia 
2.2.1 Corporate Finance in the 1970s and 1980s  
      Malaysia is a multiracial and Islam-dominated nation. Malays, known as 
Bumiputera (children of the land), and who account for 60% of the population, were 
economically and socially disadvantaged in the initial stage of economic development 
following independence in 1957, and rectification of this has been the top priority of 
national policy since the eradication of poverty was made a national goal in Malaysia’s 
Second Five-year Plan in 1971. 
     Malaysia’s uniqueness is considered to lie in the fact that it set out to build a 
financial system from an early stage in the 1960s, in order to establish the basis of 
savings for economic growth and to realize the equalization of income and dispersion of 
ownership in the interest of social stability.  Domestic banks and social security funds 
have been two pillars of the financial system, and with the securities market have been  7
designed to achieve policy purposes. 1 
      Both the mechanism to mobilize spontaneous savings by development of a 
nationwide banking network and that to mobilize compulsory savings based on social 
welfare funds were successful in achieving high saving rates and in shifting savings to 
the private and public corporate sector until the mid-1980s. Until the late 1980s, 
private savings flowed to private growth sectors through banking institutions 
according to the government’s lending guidelines, and to the government sector by 
obliging social security funds be invested in, and deposit institutions hold, Malaysian 
government bonds as reserves.  Securities investment through collective investment 
schemes, such as the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and national unit trusts, 
contributed to increasing the shareholdings of indigenous Malays. Preferential 
treatment to encourage Malays to participate in financial transactions was 
implemented.  
      This series of policies characterized Malaysian corporate finance in the 1970s 
and 1980s in terms of financing method and ownership structure.  Table 1 shows 
sources of external funds of the corporate sector for 1970-89, during which time the 
Malaysian economy as a whole suffered a shortage of funds, except in the late 1970s.  
According to the table, the financing of Malaysian firms was heavily concentrated on 
external funds, especially borrowings from banking institutions.  Equity issuance 
steadily increased in the 1980s but a large portion comprised initial public offerings for 
listing on stock exchanges or the privatization of state enterprises.2  In addition, a 
corporate debt securities market did not exist until the end of the 1980s.  Following 
introduction of a mortgage bond market in 1987 as the first private debt market in 
Malaysia, the government has implemented policies to develop the private debt market.   
Corporate debt issuance has been encouraged by the government as a way of raising 
external funds in the market since then.  3  
 
2.2.2 Corporate Finance in the 1990s 
      One of the most notable changes in Malaysian corporate finance in the 1990s 
was the high growth of new corporate debt securities issuance (Table 2) which, 
following borrowings and equity issuance, appeared as the third important financing 
instrument of Malaysian firms before the crisis of 1997.  Indeed, since 1993, debt 
issuance has continued to account for more than 10% of external funds, although 
                                                  
1  The historical development of the Malaysian financial system and its characteristics 
is discussed in detail in Suto (1998).   
2  Following a drop in the latter 1970s from 262 in 1973, the number of listed 
companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange increased from 250 to 305 during 
1980-89,  
3    Suto (2001) discusses development of the corporate debt securities market in 
Malaysia.   8
borrowings from banking institutions were the major source of external funds until 
1998. Then, can we understand that this trend in the 1990s meant steady growth of the 
corporate debt securities market?   To answer this, we should look at some biases in 
the development of the corporate debt securities market typically observed before the 
crisis of 1997.    Three points are worth mentioning. 4   
     Firstly, corporate bond issuance was preferred to private placement but not 
public offering.  The lack of public issuance in the Malaysian corporate debt securities 
market was one of the most serious impediments to an active secondary market.  
According to a report by the Rating Agency of Malaysia (RAM), as of July 1995 public 
issuance accounted for only 13.3% of total issue amount, 21.9 billion ringgits and for 
only 22 out of 166 issuances.5    
Secondly, a large amount of corporate bonds were with bank guarantees.    As of 1995, 
more than 80% of corporate bonds issued by the manufacturing industry came with 
bank guarantees.6    
Thirdly, there were no secondary markets.  The holding of corporate debt securities 
was concentrated on social security funds and financial institutions including banking 
institutions.  Lin (1996) estimated that 81.1% of private debt securities was held by 
these institutions in 1995.7  
 The above suggests that most corporate debt securities were digested in the form 
of private placement to financial institutions, i.e. the primary market was by-passed 
and such securities did not come up for sale on the secondary market.    The second and 
third points are especially significant.  There is high possibility that firms with strong 
relationships with banking institutions can issue debt securities more easily than other 
firms in terms of acquiring guarantees and private placement, i.e., the issuance cost of 
debt instruments is smaller.  Hence, a large portion of corporate bonds is akin to 
disguised bank loans. 
 
2.3 Corporate Finance and Agency Conflict in Malaysia 
2.3.1 Monitoring by Domestic Lenders and Owners 
The series of government policies aimed at accumulating funds mentioned above 
seem to have affected agency conflict in corporate finance in the following ways.     
Firstly, debt financing might be related to deepening dependency on banking 
institutions, which mitigated agency conflict between debt holders and other 
                                                  
4    Distortions in the corporate debt securities market in Malaysia are analyzed in Suto 
(2001). 
5  Figures obtained from RAM FOCUS, No. 2, December 1995, Rating Agency of 
Malaysia It is also reported that as of October 1997, 62 % of total long-term bond issues, 
17,613 out of 28,390 billion ringgit, comprised bonds with warrants which were 
privately placed. (RAM FOCUS, No. 8, January 1998, Rating Agency of Malaysia). 
6  RAM FOCUS, No. 2, December 1995, Rating Agency of Malaysia.  9
stakeholders.  Learning from the Japanese main bank system, the Malaysian 
government encouraged firms to enter relationships with banking institutions, which, 
driven toward multi-relationships with their corporate customers, not only lent but 
also gave commitments with respect to corporate bond issuance, in terms of bond 
holdings and giving guarantees. 
Thus, aiming to maintain high economic growth, it is very possible that 
government support for the banking sector diluted the monitoring ability of banks in 
responding to the expansion of corporate demand for external funds. If so, the 
government protection of the domestic banking sector accelerated the increase in debt 
financing of their corporate customers.  The agency cost of debt appeared to be 
reduced for the managers, although information asymmetry between managers and 
lenders did not decrease in reality.    Consequently, the continuing expansion of the flow 
of funds through the banking sector to the corporate sector obviously resulted in the 
concentration of risks on banking institutions.   
     Secondly, socio-economic policy directed at ownership dispersion to enhance the 
social and economic status of native Malays (Bumiputera) seems to have resulted in 
producing free-rider problems in equity markets. In 1996, the direct and indirect 
shareholdings of Bumiputera accounted for 36.7% of listed companies (Table 3).  Most 
shareholdings were indirect through institutional investors.  Institutional 
shareholdings were 47.8%, as high as in developed economies, but shareholdings of 
individuals only 13.5%.8   Major institutional investors include government agencies 
and social security funds, including the Employees Provident Fund and national unit 
trusts, both of which are state-backed institutions.  Since the 1980s, the government 
has used these agencies as strategic vehicles to hold equity issues arising from the 
privatization of government enterprises and to support equity financing of growth 
sectors.  The issues were apportioned to these institutions at favorable low prices. 
However, it is notable that collective investment schemes obviously contributed to 
dispersion of ownership in Malay society.   
     There might be two opposite views on the effects of the shareholdings of 
government agencies and social security funds on corporate governance in Malaysia. 
One view is that an increase in institutional investments is expected to mitigate the 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders if they behave as active 
shareholders on behalf of their customers.  Another view is that they have less 
incentive to monitor the firms they invest in, because they can escape fiduciary 
responsibility because of government intervention to fund management. 
If the latter view is realistic in Malaysia, information asymmetry problems must 
                                                                                                                                                  
7  Lin (1996), Tables 4a and 4b. 
8  Taken from various issues of Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia, Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange.    10
be more serious for firms held by institutions than others, which means the emergence 
of a free-rider problem but not any reduction in agency costs.    Although the regulation 
of fund management has been gradually slackened since the 1990s, as part of financial 
liberalization, it is difficult for large state-backed institutional investors to manage 
funds independently from government policy. 
     In addition, we refer to another possible view related to the signalling approach, 
and it is that high ownership of state-backed institutions might infer the low 
probability of bankruptcy for investors in general.  In this case, the cost of equity 
issuance must be reduced for firms held by these institutional investors, for they are 
favorably evaluated in the market.  Then, there must remain information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders as ever.       
      
2.3.2 Financial Liberalization and Monitoring by Foreign Investors 
     In the early 1970s, the priority of industrialization policies turned from import 
substitution to export acceleration.  Since the mid-1980s, the government has become 
more active in attracting foreign direct investment, effecting financial liberalization 
policy carefully and gradually. In the early 1990s, the liberalization of capital inflows, 
including securities investments, was almost completed and until the mid-1990s there 
was a remarkable increase in portfolio investments as well as expansion of borrowings 
from abroad.   
     How did extension of foreign ownership affect corporate valuation?  It is widely 
recognized that foreign companies and joint ventures are more concerned about 
disclosure, IR activities, and accounting information from a global viewpoint than local 
companies in Asia.  In addition, they have greater incentive to raise funds from 
international investors in the capital markets and/or offshore banking markets.  As a 
consequence of financial liberalization, entry of foreign investors to Malaysian capital 
markets rapidly accelerated dramatically expanding securities transactions in the 
early 1990s.    In 1994, the central bank introduced a series of administrative measures 
to manage short-term capital inflows, but which were lifted once financial stability was 
restored. 
     How did foreign investors influence corporate governance in Malaysia before the 
crisis?  When they behaved as long-term investors and were properly concerned about 
management as shareholders, increased foreign investment contributed to mitigating 
agency conflict by reducing information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders.  And, when the market saw the higher level of foreign ownership as a 
sign of a better company it enabled foreign-owned companies to issue equities in the 
market more easily and at less cost.   
On the other hand, when foreign investors were speculative and myopic, foreign 
ownership did not contribute to reducing agency costs and likely disrupted the 
disciplinary function of shareholders.   Nevertheless, it is still possible that the  11
market wrongly interpreted foreign ownership as a sign of a good company.  In this 
case, increasing foreign ownership could have confused the evaluation of corporate 
value and induced excessive investment or non-productive investment as a result of the 
easy issuance of equity capital. 
 
 
3 Determinants of Capital Structure: Cross-sectional Analysis   
3.1 Effect of Dependency on Banks 
3.1.1 Hypotheses 
     To examine the determinants of corporate finance in Malaysia in the late 1990s, 
we test some hypotheses with respect to the relation between capital structure and 
agency costs.  The basic hypothesis to be tested in this section is that dependency on 
banks contributes to a reduction in the agency cost of debt in general.     
As proxies for capital structure we use debt assets ratios (debt ratios) for both 
book value and market value.  In order to exclude the effect of the availability of 
internal funds on external fund raising, we should introduce a suitable proxy.  Hence, 
we chose proxies for dependency on banks and the availability of internal funds, and 
five control variables: tax-shields, collateral, firm size, business risk, and industrial 
dummies.9 
 
(1) Dependency on Banks     
      For Malaysian firms, the strong relationship with banking institutions might 
have been critical not only for securing bank loans but also for reducing agency conflict 
with respect to corporate debt securities issuance as mentioned above.  With banking 
institutions monitoring corporate management as lenders, dependency on them likely 
has a positive influence on debt ratio because such higher dependency reduces the 
agency cost of other debt.  We thus chose bank loans and advances/debt as a proxy for 
a firm’s dependency on banks.   
 
(2) Availability of Internal Funds 
     According to the pecking order hypothesis of agency costs theory, corporate 
managers prefer internal funds to external funds because of the absence of agency 
conflict between insiders and the outside suppliers of funds.  Among external funds, 
they prefer debt to shares because of less agency conflict.  A company confronted with 
limited internal funds is eager to raise debt.  This hypothesis seems to explain the 
corporate finance situation of Malaysian firms when abundant investment 
opportunities were available  before  1997.   
                                                  
9  In selecting proxy variables, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) are very useful.  12
Thus, the availability of internal funds is likely negatively related to debt ratio.  
We chose net income/total assets as a proxy for the availability of internal funds.  
Thus, it is assumed that a firm with greater net cash flow faces fewer internal fund 
constraints.    
 
(3) Non-debt Tax Shield 
      The tax system of each individual country significantly affects the choice of 
financing vehicles in various ways.  According to the Modigliani-Miller theory, the tax 
exemption of interest payments is an important tax shield for debt financing.   
Depreciation is another major tax shield.    In the real world there are some other taxes, 
which affect capital structure, such as income tax on investors and shareholders and 
various tax concessions on investment. Such non-debt tax shields might be significant 
but are not considered in this analysis. 
        We use only depreciation and amortization/total assets, as a proxy for the non-debt 
tax shield that is thought to be negatively related to debt ratio.     
 
(4) Collateral Value 
      In general, firms with more tangible fixed assets find it easier to issue bonds or 
borrow money, since collateral reduces default risk for lenders. We thus use tangible 
fixed assets/total assets as a proxy for collateral value.   
     It is thought that collateral value might be positively related to debt ratio. 
However, in Malaysia, it is very common for shareholdings to be used as collateral for 
bank loans.  Hence, it is more desirable to use some other proxy including corporate 
shareholdings if we specify collateral value for each firm. Unfortunately, no such sort of 
micro data is available.  Thus, we cannot definitely determine the expected effect of 
scaled tangible assets on debt ratio in advance. 
 
(5) Corporate Size 
     A number of studies provide evidence of the positive effect of corporate size on 
debt ratio.  The major reasons are economies of scale in issuing long-term debt, 
stronger negotiating power vis-à-vis lenders, market confidence reflecting the smaller 
possibility of bankruptcy, more diversified business, etc.     
     In general, corporate size is positively related to debt ratio in the developing 
economies where default information is relatively less available than in developed 
economies.    We use the natural logarithm of asset size as a proxy for corporate size. 
 
(6) Business Risk 
     Business risk is another important control variable.  A company with higher 
business risk has more necessity to diversify risk in the equity market.  Thus, 
earnings volatility is to be negatively related to debt ratio. We use the standard  13
deviation of pre-tax total asset profit rate as a proxy for business risk as observed over 
five years.  It is assumed that the business risk of individual companies does not 
change during the period.  Other proxies such as corporate ratings might be more 
desirable but are not available. 
 
(7) Industry Effects 
     The choice of financing vehicle might be different according to industry, as 
demand for both liquidity and fixed investments is generally different from industry to 
industry.  Thus, it is necessary to control industry effects on capital structure, and so 
we introduced four major industrial dummies among non-manufacturing industries 
(according to KLSE industry codes10) to measure the effects: dummies are equal to 1.0 
for construction, plantation, property, and trading and services, and zero for ‘other’.     
 
3.1.2 Data and Regression Model 
     Data  sources  used  for  variables  are  PRIMARK Company Analysis 
(2000/October) and KLSE Annual Companies Handbook  (Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange, 1998).  The observed period is for five fiscal years from 1995 through 1999 
(April 1995 – March 2000).  Samples are 375 non-financial firms listed on KLSE11 for 
which basic data are available for the observed period.  While it might be better to 
cover the early 1990s if we desire to analyze the effect of financial liberalization and 
relaxation of controls on capital inflows on corporate governance comprehensively, data 
availability is unfortunately limited.  The basic statistics of all proxy variables 
including debt ratios are presented in Table 4.   
 
   In this section, we show cross-sectional regressions.  In section 3, we extend our 
study to comparative analysis between before and after the crisis using panel 
regressions.    The basic model for cross-sectional regressions is as follows:   
 
LEV I = a + bBD i + cIF i + dNDTS i + eCV i + fCS i +g BR i + U i                                (1)     
 
          L E V   i :   D e b t /   T o t a l   a s s e t s   o f   f i r m   i  
           BD  i  :  Bank  loans  and  advances/Total  debt   
            I F   i   :   N e t   I n c o m e   / T o t a l   a s s e t s  
                                                  
10  According to KLSE, non-financial industries are classified into 13 groups: building 
materials, construction, consumer products, foods and beverages, gaming, hotels, 
infrastructure, mining, industry products, plantations, property, trading and services.   
In advance, we estimated regressions for each of these 13 industry dummies and finally 
selected four. 
11  Number of listed companies on KLSE: 757 in 1999 (474 on the main board and 283 
on the second board).    14
         NDTS  i:  Depreciation  and  amortization  /Total  assets 
            C V   i :   F i x e d   t a n g i b l e   a s s e t s /   T o t a l   a s s e t s    
            CS  i:  Natural  logarithm  of  total  assets 
            B R   i :   B u s i n e s s   r i s k  
             U i   :   D i s t u r b a n c e   
 
3.1.3 Estimation Results   
The results of the basic model estimated with OLS are summarized in Table 5.  
The figures in the table are estimates and their t-values.  As expected, the coefficients 
of bank dependency are significantly positive on debt ratio with respect to both book 
value and market value for all observed years.  This is completely consistent with our 
hypothesis that firms more dependent on bank loans tend to be better able to reduce 
agency conflict stemming from debt financing. With regard to internal fund constraints, 
the estimated coefficients are significantly negative for both debt ratio and for all years, 
which suggests that firms with more abundant liquidity are less dependent on debt. 
This result is not inconsistent with the pecking order hypothesis regarding choice 
between internal and external funds.     
As for non-debt tax shields, most of the estimated coefficients are, as expected, 
negative, with only two cases statistically significant.  As the results are not robust, it 
is understood that the effects of debt tax shields and non-debt tax shields are unstable 
due to uncertainty regarding economic circumstances surrounding the corporate sector 
in the late 1990s.    Rather, a better understanding might be that tax shields were not a 
critical factor in the choice of financing vehicles for Malaysian firms during the 
observed period when the economy was on an upsurge.   
Corporate size is considered a key factor increasing debt financing.  The results 
show that corporate size is positively related to debt ratio except for two cases of book 
value after the crisis.  This illustrates that corporate size is accepted as default risk 
information, i.e., larger firms can more easily issue debt, especially in the market.  
Meanwhile, collateral value does not seem to affect debt financing.  Indeed we only 
obtained significantly positive estimates for 1998, with estimates for other cases being 
neither stable nor significant which might suggest tangible fixed assets are an 
inappropriate proxy for collateral in Malaysia or that it is due to various industry 
effects. 
  Lastly, the business risk result, calculated by standard deviation of pre-tax profits 
rates, is interesting.  In most cases, estimate signs are positive.  With regard to debt 
ratio of book value, they are statistically significant for three years. It is noteworthy 
that business risk is positively related to market value debt ratio as well as book value 
in 1996, when the stock market was booming. This fact suggests that firms with higher 
business risk are more dependent on debt.    If the stock market had worked well, those 
firms could have dispersed business risk widely in the market. Nevertheless, in  15
Malaysia, it seems that risk attaching to corporate activities concentrated on lenders, 
especially banking institutions, even during the period when the stock market was 
enjoying an unprecedented boom. 
 
3.1.4 Industry Effects 
We introduced four non-manufacturing industry dummies into the basic model: 
construction, plantations, property, and trading and services (1.0 for the industries and 
0 for ‘other’).  Thus, manufacturing industries are given 0 for all four dummies. Table 
6 shows the results.   
 The most notable difference in Table 6 is that collateral value coefficients are 
more significant. Not only are all estimates positive as expected but also half are 
statistically significant.  Excluding the industry effect of industry dummies, collateral 
value might be one of the key determinants of debt financing.             
Now we give a rough description of industry effects.  The construction and 
trading and services industries seem to be more dependent on debt than 
manufacturing industries while plantations and property seem to be less dependent.  
However, most estimates for the construction industry are not statistically significant. 
The three industries other than plantations were classified as typical growth sectors in 
the 1990s. The construction and trading and services industries increased fund raising 
in the corporate bond market before the crisis12 and the property sector increased 
equity issuance during the boom of the real estate market.  On the other hand, the 
traditional plantation sector did not demand external funds as actively as growth 
industries.  
 
3.2 Concentration of Ownership and Ethnic Structure   
3.2.1 Hypotheses 
     Next, we examine effects of the concentration of ownership and structure of 
ownership on corporate finance.  The top and top ten ownership shareholdings are 
used as proxies of concentration.  As far as the ethnic structure of ownership is 
concerned, we distinguish three ethnic shareholder groups: Bumiputera, 
non-Bumiputera Malays (Chinese, Indians, and other citizens), and foreigners.     
 The following three hypotheses are tested, by adding ownership-related variables 
to the basic regression model.13 
 
(1) Concentration of Ownership 
                                                  
12  Suto (2001) describes changes in corporate finance by sector in the 1990s. 
13  It is desirable to introduce institutional ownership. However, the only available data 
are corporate shareholdings (business corporations and financial institutions).    It is 
not only very difficult to understand the effects of total corporate shareholdings on 
corporate finance, but also misleading.  16
Higher concentration on large shareholders is expected to mitigate agency 
conflict between insiders and outsiders.  Thus, shares of top shareholders are to be 
negatively related to debt ratio. 
 
(2) Ethnic Structure of Ownership 
 Government policy aimed at the social dispersion of ownership in Malay 
society might have increased the free-rider problem in corporate control.   Only if 
such policy were accompanied by enhancing the consciousness of Bumiputera as 
shareholders and/or an improvement in fund management efficiency at institutions 
that are their agents, would Bumiputera shareholdings have contributed to reducing 
the agency cost of equity financing.  If not, the estimated coefficients of Bumiputera 
shareholdings are to be positively related to debt ratio. 
 Thus, Bumiputera shareholdings are considered neutral or positively related to 
debt ratio.  In other words, they are not concerned about corporate management or 
rather they misjudge corporate valuation.     
  
(3) Ownership by Foreigners 
        Foreign  ownership  is  thought to contribute to disciplining corporate 
management if international investors are more concerned about corporate value and 
demand more information than local investors.  If so, the estimated coefficients of 
foreign shareholdings are to be negatively related to debt ratio. 
 However, it is possible short-run foreign investment could adversely influence 
corporate value from a long-term viewpoint.  In this case, increasing foreign 
investments might rather increase agency conflict.   
 
3.2.2 Data and Regression Model 
  Ownership data are collected from KLSE Annual Companies Handbook 1998.   
As comparable data for individual companies are incomplete, we have to reduce the 
sample size for estimation.  Some 352 samples are available including ownership 
concentration and 326 including ownership structure by ethnic group.  In Table 7, 
basic statistics of ownership proxies are summarized.  We use 1998 figures for 
cross-sectional analyses for each of five fiscal years.   Annual data are desirable but we 
do not have them. 
     Concentration of ownership is remarkably high.  The mean of the top share is 
about 30%, and of the top ten, 65%.  With regard to ethnic ownership, the mean of 
Bumiputera shareholdings is 32% and that of foreigners, 19%.  The remaining 49% is 
for Malaysian citizens other than Bumiputera. 
      Using  regression  models  we  added ownership concentration and ethnic structure 
separately to the basic model (1).   
  17
3.2.3 Estimation Results     
            Firstly, we discuss the effects of ownership concentration.  According to 
regression results, both the top and top ten shareholdings are negatively related to 
debt ratio.    In addition, all estimates are statistically significant.    Only the results for 
the top ten are summarized in Table 8, since those for the top share are more robust.  
This suggests that ownership dispersion is accompanied by free-rider problems at 
small shareholders and leads to the high cost of equity issuance.  Here it should be 
mentioned that it seems against the policy of the World Bank to recommend dispersion 
of the ownership of family businesses or large shareholdings in order to improve 
corporate management in Asia.14   
      Next, let us look at the results of regression including ethnic ownership 
presented in Table 9.  Bumiputera shareholdings, including direct holdings of 
individuals and indirect holdings through institutions, are not significantly related to 
debt ratio.  We understand that increasing ownership by Bumiputera has no 
significant effect on choice of corporate financing.  In other words, Bumiputera 
shareholders have not played any significant role in disciplining the corporate 
management of the firms they invest in.  As long as the government continues its 
social policy to increase Bumiputera ownership on a preferential basis, it might keep 
producing silent shareholders so that free-rider problems become more serious.     
      With regard to foreign ownership, on the other hand, we recognize that in most 
cases the estimates show a negative relation with debt ratio.  Thus, this suggests that 
increasing foreign ownership contributes to disciplining corporate management, or that 
foreign ownership is accepted as a sign indicating high profitability or high growth of 
such firms in the market.  Focusing on market value debt ratio, estimates of foreign 
ownership are systematically negative both before and after the crisis of 1997.   
Therefore, it is believed foreign investors played a certain role in disciplining corporate 
management as shareholders.   
 
4  Corporate Finance and Investment Behavior before the Crisis: Panel Analysis  
4.1 Corporate Finance Before and After the Crisis 
† The results of cross-sectional analyses presented in section 3 are robust and 
consistent with our hypotheses on the effects of bank dependency and ownership 
structure during the observed period.  In this section, we move on to panel analysis in 
order to consider changes in corporate finance via time series.  There is no doubt big 
structural changes in the financial system as well as the economy were seen after the 
crisis.  Introducing structural change explicitly, we compiled two sets of panel data by 
dividing basic data into two years before and two years after the crisis, 1995-96 and 
1998-99, respectively.  Then, we estimated panel regressions for each of the periods. 
                                                  
14  See Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).  18
Explanatory variables are five proxies except industry dummies and business risk 
which are common to all observed years. We also have to exclude ownership-related 
variables from panel regressions for the same reason.     
     Table 10 summarizes the results.  We use both plain OLS and a fixed effect 
model according to chi squares of the Housman test.  The OLS results were consistent 
with those of cross-sectional regression. On the other hand, regarding the results of 
fixed effect model, we see an interesting difference between before and after the crisis.  
The coefficient of bank dependency turns negative with debt ratio after the crisis, 
although it is positively related before. 
     Thus, there seems to be a tendency for the less bank-dependent to have suffered 
more seriously from excess debt and a deteriorating balance sheet after the crisis.  
This is in sharp contrast to more bank-dependent firms being able to more easily raise 
funds by debt financing before the crisis.       
 
4.2 Estimation of Investment Function   
     Finally, let us examine the relationship between the debt ratio and corporate 
investment. Our hypothesis is that highly-leveraged firms were inclined to implement 
excess investment before the crisis.  We estimated the following simple investment 
function to test this hypothesis.15 
 
      I it = a + b ROA it + c Log K it-1 + LEV it +uit                              (2) 
 
                Iit = LOG Kt / Kt-1 of firm i at fiscal year t 
             K t   :   T a n g i b l e   f i x e d   a s s e t s   a t   t               
         ROAi  t  :  Expected  return  on  Investment  at  t 
          K   i t - 1   :   S i z e   o f   c a p i t a l   a t   b e g i n n i n g   o f   t  
         L E V   i   t   :   D e b t   r a t i o   
              u i t :   E r r o r   a t   t  
 
We use the increase rate in fixed tangible assets as a proxy for corporate 
investment. With regard to a proxy for expected return on investment or the 
marginal efficiency of capital, we use the pre-tax total assets profit rate at t.    In this 
formulation, it is assumed that choice of financing measure is completely reflected in 
the debt ratio.  It is also assumed that expected return on investment is realized 
and marginal return equals average return.  We conducted both cross-sectional 
regressions and panel regressions.   
                                                  
15  Hanazaki (2000) used leverage (debt-net worth) as a proxy for financial risk and 
estimated an investment function. However, debt ratio is a proxy for type of corporate 
finance in this study.    19
 
4.3 Corporate Investment Estimation Results   
  Results of data before the crisis are summarized in Table 11, and those after the 
crisis in Table 12.  Panel regressions are effected both by plain OLS and by the fixed 
effect model.  As Table 11 shows, results are consistent for all cases.  Debt ratios are 
positively related to investment, as expected.  With regard to the effect of size of 
capital equipment, firms with less tangible fixed assets tend to increase investment 
more actively.  Coefficients of current return on assets are negatively related to 
investment. This means an increasing rate of return on future investment in the boom 
before the crisis. In other words, the lower the current rate of return on assets, the 
higher the return on investment, so that firms with a lower current rate of return 
invest more actively. Considering the appropriateness of the chosen proxy variable for 
return on investment, we also used ROAt-1 instead of ROA t, but the sign remained 
negative.  
  Next, let us look at investment behavior after the crisis. According to the results 
shown in Table 12, there is a sharp contrast with the period before the crisis.  Firstly, 
debt ratios are negative to investment except that for market value in 1998, just after 
the crisis.    With regard to panel regression, debt ratio coefficients for market value are 
negative but not statistically significant because of the instability seen in the period 
just after the crisis.  However, we can understand that firms with a high debt ratio 
suffered more during the period of economic distress after the crisis.  Secondly, 
coefficients of return to investment are positive except results for the fixed effect model.   
Roughly, this translates into a negative expectation on the part of firms regarding 
future return. Thus, firms were generally passive to investment after the crisis.     
 
In sum, we understand that increasing dependency on debt financing caused 
excess investment before the crisis, which is definitely a key domestic factor 
accelerating economic distress in 1997 and caused instability in the Malaysian economy.   
Before the crisis, the information ability of banks to screen borrowers seems to have 
been overestimated, or rather could not be properly estimated given government 
protection of the domestic banking sector.  This weakened the corporate governance 
function of lenders. In addition, domestic shareholders, who accounted for a large 
portion of corporate ownership, seemingly could not compensate for the weakened 
monitoring of firms on the part of banking institutions.   
 
5 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
      It is misleading to analyze developing economies empirically without properly 
considering the particular institutional framework and historical background.  The 
contribution of this paper is to link the corporate governance mechanism with features 
of corporate finance in Malaysia, in other words, the commitment of banking  20
institutions to the debt financing of corporate customers and the peculiar corporate 
ownership structure as a result of implementation of the Bumiputera policy.  This 
study finds some interesting facts concerning corporate governance in Malaysia. 
The deepening debt ratio of listed companies was obviously related to 
dependency on banking institutions before the crisis.  As far as ownership structure is 
concerned, increasing ownership by Bumiputera played no significant role in 
disciplining corporate management. These facts imply that corporate risk was 
concentrated on banking institutions and that their ability to monitor corporate 
customers weakened.  Thus, increasing debt financing supported by banking 
institutions worked to accelerate excessive corporate investments before the crisis.  
On the other hand, foreign ownership contributed to reducing the agency cost of equity 
financing by disciplining corporate management.    Firms with concentrated ownership, 
which is typically observed in family businesses, also seem to be better disciplined than 
firms whose ownership is dispersed through the observed period. 
The restructuring of corporate governance is a primary agenda for future growth 
of the Malaysian economy.  In 2001, the government strengthened its Bumiputera 
corporate ownership policy by making 30% ownership the minimum target.  The 
policy for development of the corporate debt securities market in the Financial Sector 
Master Plan, published in April 2001, emphasizes deregulation of the corporate debt 
securities market, aiming to expand issuance by lowering issue costs and abolishing 
the rating obligation.  Contrary to these policies, empirical results suggest that the 
following three points are important for an improvement in corporate governance on 
the part of both lenders and owners. 
  Firstly, it is necessary to lower the concentration of risk in the banking sector 
and to enhance the monitoring ability of lenders by reducing disguised bank loans with 
a high commitment to bond issuance and other debt financing.  Unquestionably, it is 
also necessary to increase transparency in lending by disclosure on the part of banking 
institutions and legal provisions related to lenders’ rights.   
Secondly, major domestic institutional investors, namely social security funds 
and investment funds, have to behave as agents of their customers.    Their behavior as 
investors or shareholders will mitigate the free-rider problem found in Bumiputera 
corporate ownership.  Then, fund management has to be independent from 
government interference.  However, it is highly questionable whether this aim can be 
achieved if Bumiputera corporate ownership policy is strengthened.   
      T h i r d l y ,  l o n g - t e r m  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t ors will be important players in the capital 
market in terms of disciplining Malaysian firms. Transparency of both corporate 
management and securities markets, including improvement of disclosure, rating, and 
audit systems, is most important to attract long-term investors, who are concerned 
about corporate value from a long-term viewpoint.  21
References 
Claessens, Stijin, Simeon Djankov and Larry H.P. Lang(2000)  East Asian 
Corporations: Heroes or Villains?,    World Bank Discussion Paper No.409. 
Diamond, D.W.(1984) Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, Review of 
Economic Studies, 51, pp.393-414. 
Hanazaki, Masaharu(2000) An International Comparison of Corporate Investment 
Behavior—Some Implications for the Governance Structure in Japan, August 
2000(mimeo), Research Institute of Capital Formation , Development Bank of 
Japan.pp.1-48. 
Horiuchi, Akiyoshi and Ryoko Okazaki(1994) Capital Markets and the Banking Sector:
Efficiency of Japanese Banks in Reducing Agency Costs, ed. By Ryuzo Sato, 
Richard M.Levich, and Rama V. Ramachandran Japan, Europe, and International 
Markets: Analytical and Empirical Markets, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.197-219.  
Hoshi,Takeo, A. Kashyap and D.Scharfstein(1990) Bank Monitoring and Investmenet: 
Evidence from Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking 
Relationships, in ed.by R.G.Habbard, Asymmetric Information, Corporate 
Finance, and Investment, University of Chicago Press. 
Ikeo, Kazuhito and Shinichi Hirota (1992) Capital Structure and the Role of Main 
Bank  
in Japan, ed. by Akiyoshi Horiuchi and Naoyuki Yoshino The Analysis of the 
Japanese Financial System, Tokyo University Presspp.39-71(in Japanese). 
Leland, H.E. and D.H.Pyle(1977) Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and 
Financial Intermediaries, Journal of Finance, 32, pp.371-387. 
La porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de Siliances, Andrei Schleifer, Robert W.   
Vishny(1998) Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, vol.106. no.6, 
pp.1113-1155. 
Lin,See Yan(1996)  Financial Institutions’ Investment in Malaysian Bonds: Demands, 
Opportunities and Key Issues, Presentation Paper of the Conference on Ringit 
Bond Market Trust: Institutional Investors’ Role and Perspectives, October 1 
1996, Kual Lumpur. 
Jensen, M. and J. Mechling(1976) Theory of the Frim: Managirial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Capital Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp.305-360. 
Roe, Mark(1994) Strong Managers, Weak Owners…The Political Roots of American 
Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press. 
Schleifer,Andrei and Robert W.Vishny (1997) A Survey of Corporate Governance, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol.LII, No.2, June 1997, pp.737-783. 
Shyam-Sunder, Lakshmi and Stewart C. Myers(1999) Testing static tradeoff against 
pecking order models of capital Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 
pp.219-244.  22
Suto, Megumi(1998) Saving Mobilization and Financial Institutional Building in 
Malaysia,  The JSRI Journal of Financial and Securities Markets, No.16 
November 1998, pp.57-88.(in Japanese) 
Suto, Megumi(2000) The Financial Crisis and Structural Reform in Malaysia, ed by  
Masayoshi Tsurumi, The Asian Financial Crisis and Structural Reform of the 
Financial Systems, Hosei University Press, pp.253-281.( in Japanese) 
Suto, Megumi(2001) The Financial Crisis and Private Debts Markets in Malaysia, The 
JSRI Journal of Financial and Securities Markets No.16 January 2001, 
pp.61-78.(in Japanese) 
Titman, Sheridan and Roberto Wessels(1988) The Determinants of Capital Structure 
Choice, The Journal of Finance, vol.XLIII, No. 1 March 1988, pp.1-19. 
 
Wiwattanakantang, Yupana(1999) “ An empirical study on the determinants of the 






























††潷⁦ ⁎⁉⁯⁃潲慴攠卥瑩 ⁔瑡 ‥ 潦
⁅牮慬 ⁃慴
慲 慬 䙩 ††††瑡 †卨慲敳 ⁄ †††⁔瑡 ⁆ 湡湣 ⁓散物瑩
湫 潭敳 ⁓捵敳
ㄸ †††††† 㤴 ⸴
ㄹ㜵 㠵 ㄱ㘴 㜶 ††††††
ㄹ㠰 㔶㐸 㘸 †††††† 㘴㘹 ㈮
ㄹ㠵 㔶㔳 ㈲㘱 㜹ㄴ 㘴 †††††† 㠵㔹 㜮





††††潷⁦ ⁎⁉⁯⁃潲慴攠卥瑩 ⁔瑡 † ‥⁯ ‥⁯ ‥⁯
⁅牮慬 ⁂牲 ⁓ ⁄扴
敲捩 †䙩 ††††瑡†卨慲敳 † †††⁔瑡 ⁆楮楮 ⁓ 散畲
† 散畲
ㄹ㤰 ㄳㄶ 㜱㔴 ㈰㌱ 㤴㘴 ㈲〳 ㄱ㘶 ㌱㤸 㘳⸵ ㈹⸶ 㘮
ㄹ㤱 ㄶ㐴 㜱〳 ㈳㔵 ㌱㘰 ㈱㐶 㔳〶 ㈸㠵 㠱⸶ ㄱ⸰ 㜮
ㄹ㤲 㠵㈳ 㐱〵 ㄲ㘲 㤵㐶 ㈲㘹 ㄱ㠱 ㈴㐴 㔱⸷ ㌹⸱ 㤮
ㄹ㤳 ㄱ㔰 㔵㐵 ㄷ〵 ㌴㐱 ㌳㘴 㘸〵 ㈳㠵 㜱⸵ ㄴ⸴ ㄴ⸱
ㄹ㤴 ㄶ㤱 㘳ㄱ ㈳㈲ 㠲㈹ 㔵〶 ㄳ㜳 ㌶㤶 㘲⸹ ㈲⸳ ㄴ⸹
ㄹ㤵 㐰㠵 ㄲ㘶 㔳㔲 ㄳ〵 㤲〱 ㈲㈵ 㜵㜸 㜰⸶ ㄷ⸲ ㄲ⸱
ㄹ㤶 㜲㠱 ㄹ㜴 㤲㔵 ㄴ㤵 ㄲ㌸ ㈷㌴ ㄱ㤹
ㄹ㤷 㘱㔱 ㈲㘰 㠴ㄲ ㄷ㔲 ㄵ㐷 ㌲㤹 ㄱ㜱
ㄹ㤸 㠵㘰 㘴〵 ㄴ㤶 ㄶ㘲 ㄰㠳 ㄲ㐹 ㈷㐵 㔴⸵ 〮








䉵 渭畭 湥 慬
㠮 㘮 㔮 〰⸰
ㄹ㤶 ‱〮
呹灥⁯⁉










ㄹ㤵 ㄹ㤶 ㄹ㤷 ㄹ㤸 ㄹ㤹
猯⁁獳 潯欠
†† 〮㈱ 〮㈴ 〮㈸ 〮㌷ 〮㌶
††摩 〮㈰ 〮㈴ 〮㈷ 〮㌰ 〮㈶
†† 〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰
†† 㠴 〮㠳 ㈮㠶 㔮㤲 㔮ㄴ
††却摡⁄癩慴 ㄸ 〮ㄸ 〮㈶ 〮㐹 〮㐹
猯⁁獳步⁶
†† 〮ㄲ 〮ㄳ 〮㈶ 〮㌱ 〮㈵
††摩 〮〹 〮㄰ 〮㈴ 〮㌰ 〮㈱
†† 〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰
†† 㘶 〮㘶 〮㠹 〮㠶 〮㠲
††却摡⁄癩慴 ㄲ 〮ㄲ 〮㈱ 〮㈳ 〮㈱
䉡⁌猯
†† 〮㐴 〮㐳 〮㐳 〮㐵 〮㐴
††摩 〮㌶ 〮㌴ 〮㌶ 〮㐱 〮㌹
†† 〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰
†† 〰 ㄮ〰 ㄮ〰 ㄮ〰 ㄮ〰
††却摡⁄癩慴 ㌹ 〮㌸ 〮㌸ 〮㌷ 〮㌷
琠䥮捯瑳
†† 〮〶 〮〵 〮〰 ⴰ⸱ ⴰ⸰
††摩 〮〶 〮〵 〮〳 〮〰 〮〱
††湩浵 〮 〮 㐮 㐮 ㄮ
†† 㐱 〮㘸 〮㔴 〮㘸 〮㜸
††却摡⁄癩慴 〷 〮㄰ 〮㈴ 〮㐶 〮㈱
散楡潮⽁
†† 〮〱 〮〲 〮〲 〮〲 〮〲
††摩 〮〱 〮〱 〮〱 〮〲 〮〲
†† 〰 〰 〰 〰 〮〰
†† 〹 〮ㄸ 〮㈱ 〮㔹 〮㈲
††却摡⁄癩慴 〱 〮〲 〮〲 〮〳 〮〲
硥⁔楢⁁獳獳
†† 〮㐰 〮㐱 〮㐱 〮㐴 〮㐴
††摩 〮㌸ 〮㌹ 〮㌹ 〮㐳 〮㐳
†† 〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰
†† 㤳 〮㤴 〮㤵 〮㤷 〮㤶
††却摡⁄癩慴 ㈱ 〮㈲ 〮㈲ 〮㈲ 〮㈳
瑡⁁獳
†† 㜱㜷 㘸 ㄸ㘵 ㄲ㘷㐴 ㄳ〵ㄳ㔴
††摩 ㈴㘶 㘳 㤱 〵 ㌰
††湩浵 㔴 ㈱ 㔳 ㄴ
†† 〰㌰ ㌲㐸〰 ㌸㜱㐰 㐳㜳㈰ 㐸㜸㐰
††却摡⁄癩慴 㔳〷 ㈴㜱〵 ㌱㐳㤱 ㌴㐱〸 ㌶㤵㐷㤵
䉵獩獳⁒獫
†† 〮ㄱ 〮ㄱ 〮ㄱ 〮ㄱ 〮ㄱ
††摩 〮〵 〮〵 〮〵 〮〵 〮〵
†† 〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰
†† 〰 ㈮〰 ㈮〰 ㈮〰 ㈮〰
††却摡⁄癩慴 ㈰ 〮㈰ 〮㈰ 〮㈰ 〮㈰




䑥扴⁒瑩 ⁖略 ㄹ㤵 ㄹ㤶 ㄹ㤷 ㄹ㤸 ㄹ㤹
瑡湴 〮〳 〮〰 ⴰ⸵ 〮ㄶ 〮〵
〮㌹ 〮〸 ⴰ⸶ 〮㤲 〮㌰
⁄数敮摥湣 〷 ⨪ 〵 ⨪ 〮〶 ⨪ 〳 〮ㄱ ⨪
㌮㌴ ㈮㌶ ㈮㘴 〮㘵 ㈮㈴
慬⁆湤 ⸱㜵 〮 ⨪ ⸷㌸ 〮 ⨪ ⸶㠸
ⴱ〮 ⴸ⸳ ⴱ㜮 㘷 㔴
渭摥扴⁔⁓ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸱ ⨪ 㐳 ㈳ 㘳
ⴰ⸰ ⴳ⸵ ⴱ⸰ ⴰ⸴ 〮㠹
敲慬⁖ 〰 ⴰ⸰ 〮〱 〮ㄳ 〲
〮ㄱ ⴰ⸰ 〮㐰 ㄮ㘶 ⴰ⸳
慴攠卩 〮〱 ⨪ 〱 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〰 ⴰ⸰
㈮㤲 ㈮㤱 ㌮㔰 〮㐲 〮㔷
⁒ 〮〵 〮ㄲ ⨪ ㄲ ⨪ ⴱ⸱ ㄮㄸ ⨪
ㄮ㈳ ㈮㠴 ㈮㐲 ⴰ⸸ ㄰⸸
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 〮㈶ 〮㈱ 〮㔳 〮㔴 〮㐸
瑩 ㈳⸶ ㄸ⸴ 㜳⸳ 㜵⸷ 㔹⸲
䑥⁒慴 慲琠
瑡湴 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ ㈵ ⴰ⸱ ⴰ⸲ ⨪ ㄹ
ⴲ⸹ ⴴ⸳ ⴱ⸲ ⴲ⸵ ⴲ⸰
⁄数敮摥湣 〳 ⨪ 〮〰 〮〵 ⨪ 〮〸 ⨪ 〷 ⨪
㈮㐱 〮㘳 ㈮〹 ㈮㠰 ㌮〱
慬⁆湤 ⸶ㄶ 〮 ⨪ ⸲㌳ 〮 ⨪ ⸴㔰
ⴷ⸸ ⴵ⸷ ⴴ⸷ ⴳ⸳ ⴸ⸳
渭摥扴⁔⁓ 〮ㄳ ⴰ⸲ ⴱ⸰ ⨪ ⴰ⸱ 〮〴
〮㐴 ⴰ⸷ ⴲ⸱ ⴰ⸴ 〮ㄲ
敲慬⁖ 〱 〰 〮〵 〮ㄱ ⨪ 〮〴
ⴰ⸵ 〮〳 ㄮ㄰ ㈮㌱ ㄮ〹
慴攠卩 〮〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〳 ⨪
㘮ㄴ 㜮㌴ ㌮㘸 㐮㠹 㐮㈵
⁒ ⴰ⸰ 〮〸 ⨪ 〶 ⴰ⸱ 〮〱
ⴰ⸱ ㈮㘷 ㄮㄷ 〮㜰 〮ㄷ
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 〮㈱ 〮㈱ 〮ㄱ 〮ㄶ 〮㈴
瑩 ㄷ⸸ ㄷ⸸ 㠮

















䑥扴⁲⁖ ㄹ㤵 ㄹ㤶 ㄹ㤷 ㄹ㤸 ㄹ㤹
瑡湴 〮〳 〮〱 ⴰ⸴ 〮ㄵ 〮〷
〮㐵 〮㈰ ⴰ⸴ 〮㠸 〮㐰
⁄数敮摥湣 〶 ⨪ 〵 ⨪ 〮〵 ⨪ 〮〱 〮〹
㌮ㄲ ′㈵ ㈮ㄸ 〮㌸ ㄮ㤲
慬⁆湤 ⸱ㄷ 〮 ⨪ ⸷㐹 〮 ⨪ ⸶㐳
ⴹ⸴ ⴷ⸹ ⴱ㠮 㜴 〶
渭摥扴⁔⁓ ⴰ⸵ ⴰ⸸ ㄱ ⴰ⸵ 〮㈴
ⴱ⸱ ⴱ⸷ ⴲ⸶ ⴱ⸲ 〮㌲
敲慬⁖ 〳 〮〴 〮〷 ㄹ ⨪ 〮〶
〮㜸 ㄮㄸ ㄮ㜹 ㈮㐴 〮㜳
慴攠卩 〮〱 ⨪ 〱 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〰 〮〰
㈮㤳 ㈮㠱 ㌮㔸 〮㔰 〮㌳
⁒ 〮〵 〮ㄲ ⨪ ㄱ ⨪ ⴰ⸲ ㄮㄸ ⨪
ㄮㄹ ㈮㠳 ㈮㌵ ⴰ⸸ ㄰⸹
††瑲瑩 ⴰ⸰ 〮〳 〮〴 〮㄰ 〮ㄶ ⨪
ⴰ⸴ ㄮ㈷ ㄮ㈶ ㄮ㔸 ㈮㌶
††偬瑡瑩 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ ㄱ ⴰ⸱ ⨪ ㄸ ⴰ⸱
ⴳ⸲ ⴳ⸴ ⴴ⸷ ⴲ⸹ ⴱ⸷
††偲敲 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ 〸 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ ⴰ⸰
ⴱ⸱ ⴱ⸷ ⴲ⸹ ⴲ⸰ ⴰ⸷
†⁔⁡搠卥牶 〳 〳 〮〴 〵 〮〲
ㄮ㐶 ㄮ㔰 ㄮ㘶 ㄮ〸 〮㐴
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 ㈸ 〮㈵ 〮㔷 〮㔶 〮㐹















瑡湴 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ ㈴ ⴰ⸱ ⴰ⸲ ⴰ⸱
ⴲ⸹ ⴴ⸱ ⴱ⸰ ⴲ⸵ ⴱ⸸
⁄数敮摥湣 〳 ⨪ 〮〰 〮〴 〷 ⨪ 〮〷 ⨪
㈮ㄸ 〮㔰 ㄮ㘵 ㈮㔳 ㈮㜴
慬⁆湤 ⸵㠵 〮 ⨪ ⸲㌲ 〮 ⨪ ⸴㈹
ⴷ⸳ ⴵ⸲ ⴴ⸸ ⴳ⸴ ⴷ⸹
渭摥扴⁔⁓ ⴰ⸱ ⴰ⸵ 㔳 ⴰ⸴ ⴰ⸲
ⴰ⸵ ⴱ⸶ ⴳ⸲ ⴱ⸳ ⴰ⸷
敲慬⁖ 〰 〮〲 〮ㄱ ⨪ 〮ㄵ ⨪ 〸
〮〳 〮㤵 ㈮㈴ ㌮〴 ㄮ㠶
慴攠卩 〮〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〲 ⨪
㘮ㄸ 㜮〹 ㌮㐶 㐮㤱 㐮〷
⁒ ⴰ⸰ 〮〷 ⨪ 〶 ⴰ⸱ 〮〱
ⴰ⸲ ㈮㘸 ㄮㄵ ⴰ⸸ 〮㈱
††瑲瑩 ⴰ⸰ 〮〲 〮〶 〴 〮〳
ⴰ⸴ ㄮ〱 ㄮ㘷 ㄮ㈴ 〮㠴
††偬瑡瑩 ⴰ⸰ ⨪ 〶 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ ㄷ ⴰ⸱ ⨪
ⴲ⸸ ⴲ⸹ ⴴ⸲ ⴴ⸵ ⴳ⸴
††偲敲 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰
ⴱ⸳ ⴰ⸵ ⴰ⸹ ⴱ⸰ ⴰ⸵
†⁔⁡搠卥牶 〲 〮〲 〮〷 ⨪ 〮〷 ⨪ 〮〲
ㄮㄹ ㄮ㈹ ㈮㈸ ㈮ㄳ 〮㜳
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 ㈲ 〮㈳ 〮ㄷ 〮㈲ 〮㈶
瑩 ㄲ⸱ ㄲ⸳ 㠮


























†† 〮㌰ †† 〮㌱
††摩 〮㈸ ††摩 〮㈷
††湩浵 ⸰ ††湩浵 ⸰
††浵 ⸹ ††浵 ⸹
††却⁄敶 〮ㄶ ††却⁄敶 〮㈱
卨⁯⁔瀠㄰ 牥湥牳
†† 〮㘴 †† 〮ㄹ
††摩 〮㘶 ††摩 〮㄰
††湩浵 ⸱ ††湩浵 ⸰
††浵 ⸹ ††浵 ⸸








䑥扴⁒瑩 ⁖略 ㄹ㤵 ㄹ㤶 ㄹ㤷 ㄹ㤸 ㄹ㤹
瑡湴 〮㄰ 〮〷 ⴰ⸰ 〮㈳ 〮〴
ㄮ㈳ 〮㠰 〮〵 ㄮ㔹 〮㈲
⁄数敮摥湣 〶 ⨪ 〵 ⨪ 〮〶 ⨪ 〮〹 ⨪ 〮ㄲ ⨪
㌮ㄸ ㈮㔷 ㈮㐸 ㈮㈴ ㈮㌷
慬⁆湤 ⸲㈴ 〮 ⨪ ⸹㠴 〮 ⨪ ⸵㜳
ⴹ⸶ ⴶ⸳ ⴱ㈮ ㌳ ㄲ
渭摥扴⁔⁓ 〮㈶ 〮ㄶ ⴰ⸰ 〮ㄱ 〮㤳
〮㔹 〮㌶ ⴰ⸰ 〮㌱ ㄮ㈷
敲慬⁖ ㄱ 〱 〰 〮〷 ⴰ⸰
ⴰ⸳ ⴰ⸳ 〮㈱ ㄮㄷ ⴰ⸲
慴攠卩 〮〱 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〱 〮〱
㈮㤳 ㌮㈵ 㐮㐷 ㄮ㌱ 〮㠳
⁒ 〮〰 〮〸 〴 ⴰ⸱ ㄮ㌰ ⨪
〮〹 ㄮ㠰 〮㠶 ⴱ⸰ ㄱ⸲
〮 〮 ⨪ ⸲〳 〮 ⨪ ⸰㤴
ⴲ⸱ ⴲ⸸ ⴳ⸵ ⴳ⸲ ⴰ⸸
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 ㈸ 〮㈱ 〮㐱 〮㔵 〮㐹
瑩 ㈰⸷ ㄴ⸴ ㌷⸱ 㘲⸹ 㐹⸵
䑥⁒慴 慲琠
瑡湴 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸱ ⨪ 〳 〹 ㄲ
ⴱ⸴ ⴳ⸲ ⴰ⸳ ⴰ⸸ ⴱ⸱
⁄数敮摥湣 〳 ⨪ 〮ㄳ 〮〴 〹 ⨪ 〸 ⨪
㈮㈰ 〮㠹 ㄮ㘳 ㌮ㄶ ㌮㐰
慬⁆湤 ⸵㠹 〮 ⨪ ⸵㤱 〮 〮 ⨪
ⴶ⸹ ⴴ⸰ ⴶ⸸ ⴲ⸵ ⴶ⸴
渭摥扴⁔⁓ 〮㌷ 〮〲 ⴰ⸳ ⴰ⸰ 〮㈷
ㄮ㈴ 〮〷 ⴰ⸸ ⴰ⸳ 〮㜳
敲慬⁖ 〲 〱 〴 〮㄰ ⨪ 〮〳
ⴱ⸰ ⴰ⸵ 〮㠸 ㈮〸 〮㤰
慴攠卩 〮〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〴 ⨪ 〳 ⨪
㘮㈳ 㜮㘴 㐮㤲 㔮㜱 㔮〱
⁒ ⴰ⸰ 〮〵 〳 ㄱ 〲
ⴱ⸳ ㄮ㜸 ⴰ⸵ ⴰ⸷ 〮㌹
〮 ⨪ ⸱㈲ 〮 ⨪ ⸳㤶 〮 ⨪
ⴳ⸸ ⴳ⸳ ⴴ⸶ ⴶ⸰ ⴴ⸰
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 ㈴ 〮㈲ 〮㈳ 〮㈱ 〮㈷
瑩 ㄶ⸹ ㄵ⸸ ㄶ⸵ ㄴ⸹ ㄹ⸸




䑥扴⁒瑩 ⁖略 ㄹ㤵 ㄹ㤶 ㄹ㤷 ㄹ㤸 ㄹ㤹
瑡湴 〮〲 ⴰ⸱ ⴰ⸱ ⨪ 〮〱 ⴰ⸰
〮㈴ ⴱ⸱ ⴲ⸰ 〮〸 ⴰ⸱
⁄数敮摥湣 〷 ⨪ 〵 ⨪ 〮〶 ⨪ 〮〹 ⨪ 〮ㄲ ⨪
㌮㐰 ㈮㐷 ㈮㔲 ㈮㌳ ㈮㌶
慬⁆湤 ⸲㐷 〮 ⨪ ⸰㈵ 〮 ⨪ ⸵㔹
ⴱ〮 㜶 ⸹㜴 ⴷ⸸ ⴵ⸰
渭摥扴⁔⁓ 〮ㄵ 〮ㄵ 〮〵 〮〹 〮㘵
〮㌴ 〮㌲ 〮ㄲ 〮㈴ 〮㜷
敲慬⁖ 〴 〳 〳 〲 ⴰ⸰
ⴱ⸰ ⴰ⸷ ⴰ⸸ 〮㐱 ⴰ⸳
慴攠卩 〮〲 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〱 〱
㌮㈱ 㐮〹 㔮㘰 ㄮ㜷 〮㤴
⁒ 〮〱 〮㄰ ⨪ 〮〷 ⴰ⸰ ㄮ㌴ ⨪
〮㌷ ㈮㌵ ㄮ㐸 ⴰ⸴ ㄱ⸳
灵⁓桡敨摩湧 〮〰 〮〲 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰
〮ㄵ 〮㘱 ⴱ⸰ ⴰ⸶ ⴰ⸳
䙯楧⁓慲敨潬湧 ⸰㔳 〮 ⨪ ⸱㘷 〮 〮
ⴱ⸱ ⴲ⸴ ⴳ⸲ ⴱ⸲ ⴰ⸲
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 ㈹ 〮㈲ 〮㐳 〮㔵 〮㐹
瑩 ㄸ⸲ ㄲ⸸ ㌲⸱ 㔱⸴ 㐰⸸
䑥扴⁒瑩䵡整⁖
瑡湴 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ ㈸ ⴰ⸲ ⨪ ㌷ ⴰ⸲ ⨪
ⴲ⸸ ⴴ⸷ ⴲ⸶ ⴳ⸳ ⴲ⸹
⁄数敮摥湣 〳 ⨪ 〮〱 〮〳 〮〸 ⨪ 〷 ⨪
㈮ㄷ 〮㜳 ㄮ㌴ ㈮㘴 ㈮㤹
慬⁆湤 ⸶〲 〮 ⨪ ⸶㜱 〮 〮 ⨪
ⴷ⸱ ⴴ⸳ ⴷ⸶ ⴰ⸲ ⴷ⸰
渭摥扴⁔⁓ 〮㈵ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸲ ⴰ⸱ 〮〳
〮㠲 ⴰ⸲ ⴰ⸶ ⴰ⸴ 〮〸
敲慬⁖ 〴 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ 〮〳 〮〱
ⴱ⸷ ⴱ⸲ ⴰ⸳ 〮㜶 〮㌰
慴攠卩 〮〲 ⨪ 〳 ⨪ 〴 ⨪ 〵 ⨪ 〴 ⨪
㘮㐸 㜮㜰 㘮〲 㘮ㄵ 㔮㔲
⁒ ⴰ⸰ 〮〷 ⨪ 〮〱 ⴰ⸰ 〮〸
〮㘷 ㈮㌵ 〮㌰ ⴰ⸰ ㄮ㌶
灵⁓桡敨摩湧 ⴰ⸰ 〮〱 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰
ⴱ⸰ 〮㔷 ⴱ⸱ ⴰ⸷ ⴰ⸷
䙯楧⁓慲敨潬湧 ⸱〰 〮 ⨪ ⸲㌲ 〮 ⨪ ⸱ 㜪
ⴳ⸱ ⴲ⸸ ⴴ⸱ ⴳ⸷ ⴳ⸲
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 ㈴ 〮㈳ 〮㈵ 〮ㄸ 〮㈶
瑩 ㄳ⸹ ㄳ⸵ ㄴ⸶ ㄰⸲ ㄵ⸹









䑥⁒慴 琠剡瑩 琠剡瑩 琠剡瑩
⠱⤠慩渠佌匠摥 潯⁖慬攩 ⡍慲琠噡汵 ⡂潯⁖慬攩 ⡍慲 ⁖慬攩
瑡湴 〮〴 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ 㐰 ⨪ ㈴
〮㘶 ⴴ⸹ ㈮㤵 ⴳ⸳
⁄数敮摥湣 〶 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〮〶 〸 ⨪
㐮㈲ ㈮㌵ ㄮ㠲 㐮㐶
䥮整敲⁆湤 ⴰ⸹ ⨪ 㐳 ⴰ⸸ ⨪ ㈲
ⴱ㌮ 㜳 ⸴㤷 ⴱ〮
渭摥扴⁔⁓ ⴰ⸱ ⴰ⸱ 〮ㄱ ⴰ⸰
ⴰ⸴ ⴰ⸶ 〮㈵ ⴰ⸱
敲慬⁖ 〰 ⴰ⸰ 〮〵 〮〹 ⨪
ⴰ⸳ ⴰ⸵ 〮㤵 ㌮〰
慴攠卩 〮〱 ⨪ 〲 ⨪ 〱 〮〳 ⨪
㌮㤸 㤮㌷ ⴱ⸱ 㘮㈱
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 ㈳ 〮㈰ 〮㐰 〮ㄷ
⠲⥆楸敤⁅晦散⁍
⁄数敮摥湣 〳 〲 ⨪ ⴰ⸳ ⨪ 〱
ㄮ㜷 ㈮㌶ ⴳ⸵ ⴰ⸴
䥮敲湡⁆畮 ⴲ⸷ ⨪ 〮〱 ⴰ⸱ ⨪ 〶
ⴴ⸲ 〮㈷ ⴴ⸱ ⴴ⸶
渭摥扴⁔⁓ 〮㈹ 〮〵 ⴰ⸴ ⴰ⸱
〮㠵 〮㈴ ⴰ⸹ ⴰ⸷
敲慬⁖ ㈱ ⨪ ㄶ ⨪ ㄱ 〲
㌮㌷ ㌮㜶 ⴰ⸶ 〮㐱
慴攠卩 〮〳 ⨪ 〮〵 ⨪ ㌸ ⴰ⸰
㈮㔹 㔮㤳 ⴶ⸲ ⴰ⸲
橵敤⁒⵳畡牥 㠱 〮㜹 〮㜸 〮㠶
倠噡 〰 〮〰 〮〰 〮〰












瑡湴 〮㐹 ⨪ 〸 ⨪ 〮㐷 ⨪ ㈶ ⨪ 〮〹 ⨪ ㈳ ⨪ 〳 ⨪
㔮㐵 㐮〳 㔮㐷 ㌮㐱 㔮㈳ ㌮〸 㘮㔵
剥瑵牮⁯⁁瑳 ⴰ⸰ 〮〰 ⴰ⸰ 〰 〰 〰
ⴰ⸷ 〮㌶ ⴱ⸸ ⴱ⸳ ⴱ⸹ ⴲ⸱
湧⁆搠瑳ⴱ ⴰ⸰ ⨪ 〳 ⴰ⸰ ⨪ ⴰ⸰ ⨪ ⴰ 〳 ⴰ⸳ ⨪
ⴴ⸶ ⴴ⸶ ⴲ⸲ ⴱ⸹ ⴵ⸱ ⴱ㤮
䑥扴⁒瑩 䕖⁴ 〮㈰ ⨪ ㄹ ⨪ 〮㈱ ⨪ ㄰ 〹 ㄱ ⨪ 〮ㄵ ⨪ ㌲ ⨪
㌮〶 ㈮㠳 ㌮㈱ ㄮ㤰 ㄮ㜲 ㈮〴 ㌮㌵ ㌮㌶
橵敤⁒⁓煵 〶 〮〱 〮〶 〮〲 〮〰 〮〱 〮〴 〮㔲





瑡湴 〮㔳 ⨪ 〸 ⨪ 〮㐱 ⨪ ㌱ ⨪ 〮〸 ⨪ ㈷ ⨪ 㐳 ⨪
㘮〴 㐮㌹ 㘮〴 㐮〳 㔮㐶 ㌮㘹 㜮㐳
剥瑵牮⁯⁁瑳 ⴰ⸰ 〮〰 ⴰ⸰ 〰 〰 〰
ⴰ⸸ 〮㌳ ⴱ⸹ ⴱ⸴ ⴲ⸱ ⴲ⸴
湧⁆搠瑳ⴱ ⴰ⸰ ⨪ 㐰 ⴰ⸰ ⨪ 〱 〮 ⨪ ⸳㐷
ⴵ⸲ ⴵ⸱ ⴲ⸹ ⴲ⸶ ⴶ⸰ ⴱ㤮
䑥扴⁒瑩 䕖⁴ 〮㐳 ⨪ ㌴ ⨪ 〮㐴 ⨪ ㈸ ⨪ 〮㈱ ⨪ 〮㈹ ⨪ ㌶ ⨪ 㜸 ⨪
㐮ㄵ ㌮㈲ 㐮㈴ ㌮㈳ ㈮㈴ ㌮㈳ 㔮㌵ 㔮㠱

















瑡湴 〮ㄳ 〮㐲 ⨪ 〮ㄹ ㄹ ⨪ 〮〲 ㈴ ⨪ ㄸ ⨪
ㄮ㌷ ㈮㔳 ㄮ㠵 ㈮㐴 ㄮ㠰 ㈮㤶 ㈮㠷
剥瑵牮⁯⁁瑳 〮〰 ⨪ 〰 ⨪ 〰 ⨪ 〰 ⨪ 〰 ⨪ ⸰〲 ⨪
㔮㔰 㔮㘱 㔮㔳 㔮㜷 㘮㜴 ⴶ⸳
楢汥⁆硥⁁獳琭 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⨪ ⴰ⸱ ⨪ 〱 ⴰ⸴ ⨪
ⴰ⸹ ⴱ⸴ ⴲ⸱ ⴲ⸶ ⴲ⸳ ⴲ㔮
䑥扴⁒瑩 䕖 〶 ⴰ⸶ ⨪ ⴰ⸰ ⨪ ⴰ⸰ ⨪ 〶 ⴰ 〸 ⴰ⸰ ⨪ ㄱ
ⴲ⸳ ⴲ⸳ ⴲ⸴ ⴳ⸲ ⴲ⸹ ⴳ⸵ ⴴ⸰ ⴳ⸷
橵敤⁒⁓煵 〸 〮〸 〮〱 〮ㄱ 〮㄰ 〮〴 〮〸 〮㘴




瑡湴 〮㄰ 〮〱 〮ㄵ 〮ㄴ 〲 〮ㄸ ⨪ 〮ㄳ ⨪
ㄮ〱 〮㔶 ㄮ㐸 ㄮ㠳 ㄮ㔷 ㈮㈸ ㈮ㄷ
剥瑵牮⁯⁁瑳 〮〰 ⨪ 〰 〮〰 ⨪ 〰 ⨪ 〮〰 ⨪ 〰 ⨪
㔮㔳 〮㔶 㔮㘱 㔮㜵 㘮㠲 ⴶ⸲
楢汥⁆硥⁁獳琭 ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ ⴰ⸰ 〱 ⴰ⸴ ⨪
ⴰ⸹ ⴱ⸴ ⴱ⸵ ⴱ⸹ ⴱ⸸ ⴲ㐮
䑥扴⁒瑩 䕖 〳 〮〲 〮〴 ⴰ⸰ ㄰ ㄱ 〲 ⸰㈵
〮㔲 〮㌵ 〮㘴 ⴱ⸷ ⴲ⸰ ⴲ⸰ ⴰ⸶ ⴰ⸲
橵敤⁒⁓煵 〷 〮〷 〮〰 〹 〮〹 〮〲 〮〶 ⴰ⸶
⁖ 㤵 ㄶ⸰ 〴 ㄴ⸰ 㠴 㐮㠷 㐮〷
倠 〮〰 〮〰
†⁎ †⁎ ††⁎
卩慮捥⁌ †⨪⨠ㄥ †⨪‵ †⨠ 34
 
 
 
 
 
䅰†††偲⁖物
噡物 牯⁶慢
䍡氠捴
††⁄敢⁖汵攩 䑥⁔氠
††⁄敢 ⁖汵 䑥⡔⁁ⵓ牥桯汤敲 ⁅⭓桡楣攪畭
牭瑳⁃灩瑡⁓牵
††湫䑥敮湣 ⁌⁡⁁湣䑥
††䥮湤 整⁉湣潭⡁敲⁔偲楴‭⁁⁔䥴 ⁔瑡瑳
††渭⁔⁓楥汤 䑥散楡楯渠䅭潲潴䅳
††䍯汬氠噡汵 攠䅳⽔⁁
††潲慴卩 乡瑵牡⁌条物瑨洠潦⁔瑡獥瑳
††䉵⁒獫 却慮摡牤⁄癩慴⁂牥呡⁐牯慬 獳瑳
景‵⁦楳⁹㤹ⴱ㤹
䍯湣湴⁯⁏睮敲楰
††呯瀠 ‱⁳摥爧猠獨獣慬⁹
†† ‱〠敨潬敲⁳攠楮‱㤹㠠
佷湥⁓畲攠
††† ⁯䉵⁩渠ㄹ㤸⁦楳⁹
††楧湥† ⁯楧湥牳†楮㤹晩⁹ 爮
䥮⁄畭楥
†⁄畭 潮楯
†⁄畭 污湴楯渠
†⁄浭礠 牯牴
†⁄浭礠 牡摩⁡搠卥牶
灩瑡䕱灭 䙩硥搠呡⁁獥瑳⁡琠
獴浥⁒瑥 琭
散敤⁒潮⁉敮 景⁐楴⁲⁯氠䅳 瑳⁡⁴